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STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES
CRimmAL LA-W-H0OMICDE - MANSLAUGHTER - PROVOCATION.-
The deceased, while talking with the accused, told him that he,
(the deceased), had had sexual intercourse with the accused's
wife and that "he was going to take her on further." The court
in a dictum said that here there was no provocation, in the eye of
the law, to reduce the crime of murder to manslaughter. State v.
Cline, 130 S. E. 91 (W. Va. 1925).
What is such a provocation? "The provocation must be of
such a character as would naturally or reasonably arouse the pas-
sion of an ordinary man beyond the power of self-control." 29
C. J. § 118, p. 1132, and cases there cited. It seems that the
specific question which the facts of this case present has never
been discussed before by the Supreme Court of West Virginia.
The court, in basing the dictum on the old rule that "mere words,
however insulting or opprobrious, is not enough to purge the crime
of malice and reduce it to manslaughter," cites State v. White,
81 W. Va. 516, and State v. MAfrphy, 89 W. Va. 413. It is sub-
mitted that these cases are not decisive of the question here pre-
sented because the facts were in the former case that the deceased
cursed the accused, while in the latter case State v. Crawford, 66
W. Va. 114, is cited, the facts there being that the deceased
called the accused vile names. It may be that the court in de-
claring the general rule in those cases cited did not contemplate
such words as were used in this case. There is an additional
peculiarity in this case that here there was a communication by
the deceased to the accused of the adulterous relations of the de-
ceased with the wife of the accused. The court also bases its dictum
upon this: that the knowledge of the deceased's sexual intercourse
with the wife of the accused can not, as a matter of law, be a
provocation unless the accused obtained his knowledge by seeing
the act or seeing the deceased and the wife of the accused "to-
gether under such circunstances reasonably leading him to believe
that they are or have been" engaged in such act. It has been
held that there may be a provocation to reduce murder to man-
slaughter in the following instances: where someone told the ac-
cused that his daughter had been ravished by the deceased, State
v. Grugin, 147 Mo. 39; where someone told the accused of his
wife's sexual intercourse with the deceased, Richardson v. State,
70 Ga. 825; Mahen v. People, 10 Mich. 212; and where the wife
of the accused told him of the deceased's sexual intercourse with
her, Haley v. State, 123 Miss. 87; Rex v. Rothwell, 12 Cox, Cr. Cas.
145. It appears therefore that in each of these cases "mere words"
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were held to be a provocation; and also that knowledge of the de-
ceased's sexual intercourse with the deceased's wife was held to be
a provocation even though the accused did not obtain the know-
ledge by seeing the act of sexual intercourse or any circumstances
relating to such act. It would seem that knowledge of such act
should be held to be a provocation that could reduce murder to
manslaughter no matter whether that knowledge is obtained by
seeing or hearing, for the effect of the knowledge would surely
be the same in either case. It is the law that touching a person
under such circumstances as reasonably to arouse the passions of
an ordinary man is such provocation, 29 C. J. § 120, p. 1137, and
such a touching may consist of tweaking the nose, filliping on the
forehead, or spitting in the face, State v. Grugin, supra, citing,
K nuy, ChimINIL LAW, § 518. By analogy therefore it would fol-
low that the circumstances of this case would be at least as likely
to arouse that "hot blood" which reduces murder to manslaughter
as tweaking the nose, filliping on the forehead, or spitting in the
face. Hence, it is submitted that this case is one where the cir-
cumstances were such as would naturally or reasonably arouse the
passions of an ordinary man beyond his power of self-control, and
therefore it should be held, upon principle, that in a situation like
this there is sufficient provocation to reduce the crime of murder
to manslaughter.
-C. M. C.
EVDENCEL-CONTRACTS--CUSTOM AND USAGES--CONTRADICTION
OF STATUTORY DEFINITION BY TRADE USAGE OR SPECIAL CONTRACT.-
Chapter 59, § 27 Barnes, West Virginia Code, 1923, provides
that "A ton shall contain two thousand pounds." P orally con-
tracted to mine coal for D for a certain price per ton, nothing be-
ing said as to the weight of a ton. P mined coal for some time and
then notified D of a change in price and stated that the price would
be so much, per gross ton. P continued to mine coal for D and D
paid P on gross ton basis of 2,240 pounds. P" contends that he
was employed on a net ton basis of 2,000 pounds, and brought an
action for the balance of the account. D offers evidence to prow
custom among mines to mine coal on gross ton basis of 2,240
pounds. Judgment for P as to balance of account before notice
of change in price (it being held that the coal mined after notice
of change of rate to a certain price per gross ton was done under
a special contract). Held, in absence of special contract, statutory
definition controls and no evidence of custom will be admitted to
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [1925], Art. 11
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol32/iss1/11
